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MARKO VICH V. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SER VICES:
AN OUNCE OF CURE FOR A POUND OF PREVENTION
J. Hunter Appler'
There's an old saying that "an ounce of prevention is worth a
pound of cure. " Vaccinations seem to exemplify this, allowing
people to avoid diseases entirely by submitting to a simple
injection, rather than forcing them to worry about the more
difficult alternative of treating the disease once it is contracted.
Markovich v. Secretary of Health and Human Services is a case in
which an infant suffered severe injuries resulting from a
vaccination. To address such rare situations, the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act establishes a system through which
injured parties may recover medical costs from the government.
This Recent Development examines a failure of that system to serve
its intended purpose. It looks at ways in which the court's decision
in Markovich runs counter to the policies underlying the creation
of the system. It also considers the court's erroneous
interpretation of statutory language and the injustice of denying
compensation to infants injured by vaccines that results from this
misapplication. Markovich illustrates how the few children
injured by vaccines may be offered precious little financial
restitution for the unintended consequence of a technology that
keeps the rest of us healthy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The vaccine is one of the greatest discoveries of medical
science. As a preventative medical procedure,2 vaccines are able
to spare society the dire ramifications of epidemics' in exchange
1 J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2010.
2 STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1922 (27th ed. 2000) [hereinafter
STEDMAN'S] (defining vaccine as "any preparation intended for active
immunologic prophylaxis").
3 As an extreme example, Yersinia pestis, also known as "plague," killed
between twenty-five and forty-five percent of the population of Europe between
59
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for the small personal burden of a trip to the doctor and a needle-
stick. However, in a minority of cases, the patient may suffer a
serious adverse physiological reaction to the vaccination.' In these
instances, the burden borne by the individual becomes enormous.'
When the legal mechanism developed to provide relief to these
affected persons falls short of achieving its compensatory goals,
the proper functioning of the vaccination program as a whole is
threatened.
In 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit 6 decided Markovich v. Secretary of Health and Human
Services,7 a case that had arisen in the "vaccine court"' under the
1347 and 1351. 2 ROBERT S. GOTTFRIED, DICTIONARY OF THE MIDDLE AGES
257 (Joseph R. Strayer ed., Charles Scribner's Sons 1983).
4 JOHN D. DINGELL, NATIONAL CHILDHOOD VACCINE INJURY ACT OF 1986,
H.R. Doc. No. 99-908, at 6 (2d Sess. 1986); see also National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Compensation Act of 1985: Hearing on S. 827 Before the S.
Comm. On Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong. 8 (1985) [hereinafter
Hearing] (statement of Sen. Dale Bumpers); CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S.
DEPT. OF HHS, VACCINE INFORMATION STATEMENT FOR HAEMOPHILUS
INFLUENZAE TYPE B (HIB) VACCINE (1998) ("The risk of Hib vaccine causing
serious harm or death is extremely small."); CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S.
DEPT. OF HHS, VACCINE INFORMATION STATEMENT FOR DIPHTHERIA, TETANUS,
& PERTUSSIS VACCINES (2007) (listing possible moderate to severe injuries
[with rates of occurrence]: seizure [1/14,000], non-stop crying for three hours or
more [1/1,000], fever over 105 degrees Fahrenheit [1/16,000], serious allergic
reaction [less than 1/1,000,000], long-term seizures, coma, or lowered
consciousness [too rare to attribute to vaccine]); CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
U.S. DEPT. OF HHS, VACCINE INFORMATION STATEMENT FOR POLIO VACCINE
(2000) ("The risk of a polio shot causing serious harm, or death, is extremely
small.").
542 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(a) (2000) (recognizing the possibility of many serious
consequences of vaccination, up to and including death).
' 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (2000) ("The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a final
decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims.").
7 Markovich v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 477 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir.
2007) [hereinafter Markovich III], cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 92 (2007).
8 "Vaccine court" is an informal term for the Office of Special Masters, the
adjudicative body established under the U.S. Court of Federal Claims and
responsible for hearing petitions for compensation under the National Vaccine
Injury Compensation Program. Persons who believe themselves to have been
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U.S. Court of Federal Claims. The decision affirmed the holding
of the special master,9 which denied the action of the petitioner due
to the expiration of the statute of limitations under the National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program ("VICP")io of the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act ("NCVIA")." The court accepted
the government's position that the three-year statute of
limitations,12 controlling the time during which a petitioner may
bring suit for damages resulting from vaccine-related injuries, had
been triggered by an objective, not a subjective, indicator.13 This
holding is an unfortunate misstep in NCVIA jurisprudence.
By finding that an objective measurel4 of injury triggers the
statute of limitations," the court undermined the intent of Congress
to create a "user-friendly" vaccine-injury recovery system that
injured by a vaccination listed in the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act's
Vaccine Injury Table are prohibited from bringing a civil action for more than
$1,000 against either the vaccine administrator or manufacturer unless they first
file a petition in vaccine court. Judgments of the vaccine court are appealable to
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims and, then, to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. U.S. Court of Federal Claims, Vaccine Program/Office of
Special Masters, http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/vaccine-programoffice-special-
masters (last visited Oct. 21, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology).
' Petitions for relief under the VICP are heard by officers known as special
masters. Special masters are lawyers appointed by the judges of the United
States Court of Federal Claims for four-year terms. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(c)
(2000); http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/ (select "Frequently Asked
Questions" from links at left; in the "Search By" dropdown menu, select
"Answer ID" and search for "354") (last visited Oct. 21, 2008) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); see also U.S. Court of Federal
Claims, supra note 8.
'o 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -34 (2000).
" Id §§ 300aa-l to -34.
12 Id § 300aa-16(a)(2) ("[N]o petition may be filed for compensation under
the Program . . . after the expiration of 36 months after the date of the
occurrence of the first symptom or manifestation of onset. . .
13 Markovich III, supra note 7, at 1360.
14 Id. By "uobjective standard," the court means to say that the statute of
limitations begins to run when a vaccinated person exhibits some evidence that a
member of the medical profession would take as indicative of an injury. Id.
15 Id.
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supplements traditional tort litigation. 16  This decision threatens
public interest goals, with consequences reaching beyond the
parties that bring suit; it impacts both the broader purpose of the
NCVIA to act as an attractive alternative to tort litigation and the
place of vaccination in public health strategy.
Part I of this Recent Development summarizes the history of
the NCVIA and the Markovich decision. Part II, subpart A,
explains the petitioner-friendly nature of the VICP in light of
certain features of the vaccine court proceedings and the NCVIA's
legislative history. It argues that by limiting the Markoviches'
ability to recover, the court's decision stands in conflict with the
VICP's purpose. Subpart B looks at the text of the VICP's statute
of limitations and argues that the court's incorrect understanding of
the word "symptom" led to a misapplication of the statute.
II. HISTORY AND CONTEXT OF THE NCVIA AND THE
MARKOVICH DECISION
During the 1980s, a large number of lawsuits" filed against the
makers of the DTP vaccine" caused an increase in the price-per-
dose' 9 of the vaccine and forced its makers to withdraw from the
16 DINGELL, supra note 4, at 12 ("The system is intended to be expeditious
and fair. It is also intended to compensate persons with recognized vaccine
injuries without requiring the difficult individual determinations of causation of
injury and without a demonstration that a manufacturer was negligent or that a
vaccine was defective.").
1 The number of lawsuits against diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis vaccine
manufacturers rose from four in 1980 to a peak of 255 in 1986. In 1988-the
year the VICP went into effect-lawsuits filed were at 114 and they continued
to decline thereafter. The total from 1980 to 1988 was 904. Edmund W. Kitch,
Geoffrey Evans & Robyn Gopin, U.S. Law, in VACCINES 1165, 1182 (Stanley A.
Plotkin & Walter A. Orenstein eds., 3d ed. 1999).
18 "Abbreviation for ... diphtheria toxoid, tetanus toxoid, and pertussis . . .
STEDMAN'S, supra note 2, at 542.
19 Hearing, supra note 4, at 5 (statement of Sen. Paula Hawkins) (attributing
the rise in the price of the DTP vaccine from $0.11 in 1983 to $4.29 in 1985 to
lawsuits against vaccine manufacturers).
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market.2 0 Congress sought a solution to "stabilize the supply of
childhood vaccines and restore public confidence in the Childhood
Immunization Program."21 Public health officials expressed
concern that the decreasing confidence in vaccinations, coupled
with their increasing price, would threaten "herd immunity."22 In
response, Congress passed the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act which contained provisions establishing the National Vaccine
Injury Compensation Program.2 3 Under the VICP, patients injured
by the administration of a vaccine24 may bring suit against the
government in vaccine court.25 Successful petitioners can recover
the costs associated with their injuries 26 from a Vaccine Injury
Compensation Trust Fund,27 which is funded by a tax on
21vaccines.
Michael and Melissa Markovich exemplify typical parents
seeking relief under the VICP for an injured child. They brought
an action for compensation on behalf of their two-month-old
20 Id. (noting the withdrawal from the market of two of the three
manufacturers of the DTP vaccine).
21 Id. at 6.
22 "[T]he resistance to invasion and spread of an infectious agent in a group or
community, based on the resistance to infection of a high proportion of
individual members of the group . . . ." STEDMAN'S, supra note 2, at 878; see
Stephen D. Sugarman, Cases in Vaccine Court-Legal Battles over Vaccines
and Autism, 357 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1275, 1276 (2007) (indicating that fears of
losing herd immunity figured into Congress's decision to create the VICP).
23 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10(a) (2000) ("There is established the National Vaccine
Injury Compensation Program ... under which compensation may be paid for a
vaccine-related injury or death."); Sugarman, supra note 22 ("Health officials
feared the loss of herd immunity, and Congress responded by creating the
VICP.").
24 Only certain vaccines-those listed in the NCVIA's Vaccine Injury Table,
infra note 51-are covered by the act. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 1(c)(1)(A).
25 Id. § 300aa-l l(b)(1)(A) ("[A]ny person who has sustained a vaccine-related
injury, [or] the legal representative of such person if such person is a minor or
disabled, ... may ... file a petition for compensation under the Program.").
26 Id. § 300aa-15 (listing the range of recoverable costs).
27 Id. §§ 300aa-15(i) to -15(j) (describing the source of the compensation to be
paid to petitioners and authorizing appropriations for a fund).
28 26 U.S.C. § 9510 (2000) (establishing the Vaccine Injury Compensation
Trust Fund).
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daughter, Ashlyn,2 9 who received the DTaP, polio, and
Haemophilus influenzae type b vaccinations, on July 10, 2000.30
Later that day and in the weeks that followed, the Markivoches
observed their daughter blinking her eyes rapidly, an action they
did not recognize as symptomatic of any possible illness but only a
sign of fatigue.' On August 30, 2000, Ashlyn suffered her first
grand-mal seizure.32  Ashlyn continued to have seizures, which
caused her parents to seek the opinions of several doctors.3 3 In
January 2002, a neurologist diagnosed Ashlyn as having had "four
types of seizures: (1) repeated eye blinking; (2) clonic movement
of the face, arm, and leg; (3) generalized seizures with or without
focal onset; and (4) partial motor seizures."34
The Markoviches filed their VICP petition on August 29, 2003,
two years and three-hundred-sixty-four days after the date of
Ashlyn's first grand-mal seizure but three years and fifty days after
the date of Ashlyn's vaccination and first eye-blinking episode.3 5
The special master presiding over hearing the case held that
Ashlyn's eye-blinking seizure was the first symptom of injury, thus
triggering the three-year statute of limitations." As a result, the
special master dismissed the Markoviches' action.3  The Court of
29 Markovich v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, No. 03-2015V, 2005
WL 6117470, at 1 (Fed. Cl. 2005) available at http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/Sweeney.Markovich.pdf [hereinafter Markovich 1].
30 Markovich Ill, supra note 7, at 1354.
31 id.
32 "[A] generalized [seizure] characterized by the sudden onset of tonic
contraction of the muscles often associated with a cry or moan, and frequently
resulting in a fall to the ground . . . ." STEDMAN'S, supra note 2, at 1614;
Markovich III, supra note 7, at 1354-55.
3 Markovich III, supra note 7, at 1355.
3 Markovich v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 69 Fed. Cl. 327, 329-
30 (Fed. Cl. 2005) [hereinafter Markovich II].
3 Markovich Ill, supra note 7, at 1354-55.
36 Markovich 1, supra note 29, at 17.
37 d
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Federal Claims38 and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
affirmed this decision.3 9
The Markoviches filed their petition for relief within three
years of Ashlyn's first grand-mal seizure.40 This seizure marked
the first time the Markoviches recognized that their daughter was
having a possible reaction to the vaccinations and, consequently, it
was the first time they might have had a reason to seek recovery.4'
The court disagreed and held that the eye-blinking episode on July
10, 2000, was the first event that medical science could consider an
indication of injury; therefore, this event triggered the beginning of
the three year statute of limitations.4 2 By filing their petition three
years and fifty days after July 10, 2000, the Markoviches missed
their opportunity to recover."3
III. ERRONEOUS POLICY AND INTERPRETATION
A. Undermining the Goals of the NCVIA
The position on the statute of limitations espoused by the
special master and the reviewing courts is disconcerting in that it
hinders the goals that Congress, through the NCVIA, sought to
achieve.44 One of these goals was the creation of a compensatory
system for victims of vaccine injuries that was favorable to
petitioners, rather than use the system of tort litigation.45 This
38 Markovich 11, supra note 34, at 335-36.
39 Markovich Ill, supra note 7, at 1360.
4 0 Id. at 1354-55.
41 Id. at 1356.
4 2 Id at 1360.
43 d
44 See DINGELL, supra note 4, at 7 (listing "the inadequacy-from both the
perspective of vaccine-injured persons as well as vaccine manufacturers-of the
current approach to compensating those who have been damaged by a vaccine"
as one of the "overriding concerns [that] have led to the development of [the
NCVIA]").
45 Id.; Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Construction and Application of
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (42 U.S.C.S. f§ 300aa et seq.), 129
A.L.R. FED. 1, § 3 (1996).
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important goal has been recognized by courts hearing NCVIA
cases. 46
Congress framed the NCVIA in several ways to be particularly
favorable to petitioners. For example, Congress provided an
accelerated processing time for claims under the VICP, which
operates more quickly than does the tort system.4 Adding another
advantage for petitioners, Congress instituted a relaxed protocol
regulating the introduction of evidence before the special master,4 8
which does not require compliance with the complex Federal Rules
of Evidence. 4 9 Also, petitioners are not required to produce proof
of actual causation for certain claims."o The NCVIA incorporates a
"Vaccine Injury Table," which describes possible links between
certain vaccinations and injuries that could result from them."' If a
petitioner proves that he or she suffered an injury within the
predicted time period listed in the table, then the petitioner creates
a rebuttable presumption that the vaccine caused the injury.52 Even
if the petitioner is unable to make such a showing, he or she may
independently demonstrate that the vaccine actually caused the
46 See Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories, a Div. of American Home Products
Corp., 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1491 (D. Kan. 1987).
47 Shalala v. Whitecotton, 514 U.S. 268, 269 (1995); see also 42 U.S.C. §
300aa-12(d)(2)(A) (2000) (requiring that rules for special masters provide that
proceedings be "expeditious").
48 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12 (d)(2)(B) (2000) (requiring that rules for special
masters "include flexible and informal standards of admissibility of evidence");
§§ 300aa-12(d)(3)(A) to (B) (giving special masters broad discretion in allowing
evidence).
49 Hines on Behalf of Sevier v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 940 F.2d
1518, 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
50 Donaldson, supra note 45, at § 15[A].
i 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(a) (The Table lists the vaccines covered by the VICP,
the kinds of injuries that the vaccine court is willing to presume result from the
vaccinations, and the time period in which those injuries must occur in order for
the court to presume that the vaccines were the cause.).
52 Donaldson, supra note 45, at § 15[A]. If the petitioner can show by a
preponderance of the evidence that he or she received a vaccination on the
Vaccine Injury Table, suffered a listed injury listed, and did so within the listed
time period, then the government may prevail by showing by a preponderance of
the evidence that the vaccine did not cause the injury. Id.
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injury.53 Regardless, the VICP often provides some form of
compensation, even if the petitioner is unsuccessful in proving a
claim on the merits.T54 For instance, unsuccessful petitioners
whose claims are reasonable and made in good faith may recover
attorneys' fees and expenses." In comparison, successful
petitioners can recover further damages, including certain costs
associated with the injury, 6 reasonable attorneys' fees,57 and
petition expenses." In the case of death resulting from a
vaccination, the estate may be compensated for the death.'9
Finally, bringing an initial suit in the VICP has additional
advantages for petitioners because the petitioners may institute a
tort claim even after losing on the merits before the special
master.60 These explicit, petitioner-friendly features of the VICP
5 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(c)(1)(C)(ii) (requiring that a petition for
compensation that does not demonstrate the occurrence of a symptom or
manifestation of onset listed on the Table within the Table's prescribed time
period include evidence that the petitioner suffered an injury "not set forth in the
Vaccine Injury Table but which was caused by a vaccine [in the Table] . . . , or
[suffered an injury] . . . set forth in the Vaccine Injury Table the first symptom
or manifestation of the onset . . . of which did not occur within the time period
set forth in the Table but which was caused by a vaccine referred to [in the
Table] .... ).
54 Id. § 300aa-15(e)(1) (permitting awards of attorneys' fees to petitioners,
even those who are unable to succeed on their cases' merits); HRSA - National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, http://www.hrsa.gov/
vaccinecompensation/statistics report.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2008) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
5'42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1).
56 Id. § 300aa-15(a)(1) (allowing compensation for costs that have been or are
predicted to be incurred as a result of the vaccine-related injury, including costs
of medical care, diagnosis, therapy, special equipment, travel expenses, and
several other things).
5 Id. § 300aa-15(e)(1)(A).
5 1Id. § 300aa-15(e)(1)(B).
59 Id. § 300aa-15(a)(2) (describing awards that survivors of decedents may be
given if successful).
60 Id. §§ 300aa-1 1(a)(2)(A), 300aa-21 (allowing petitioners, even those whose
claims were not found worthy of compensation by the special master, to file
actions against vaccine manufacturers or administrators in civil court).
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go further than any mere statements made in committee hearings61
in evincing a Congressional intent to make the VICP a simpler,
quicker, and more favorable system than civil tort litigation for
victims of vaccine injury.
However, the Markovich court's holding that the statute of
limitations accrues upon the occurrence of indicia that would be
recognized as evidence of an injury by the medical profession
undermines the spirit of the NCVIA. As previously discussed,
one purpose of the Act is to provide relief to parents whose
children have been injured by vaccination. By finding that the
statute of limitations accrues upon the first occurrence of an event
that a medical professional would view as evidence of an injury,
many parents will be left without a remedy. The holding imputes
to parents the professional medical knowledge that would be
required to know that something as seemingly insignificant as
rapid eye-blinking was evidence of a serious medical problem.
This ruling effectively denies petitioners, who do not possess a
sophisticated understanding of pediatric pathology, the opportunity
to recover. 62 Not only are such petitioners denied relief under the
VICP, but the NCVIA prohibits them from seeking redress in civil
court.6' This means that petitioners who lose on the merits before
the special master have a second chance, while those who are time-
barred from engaging the VICP altogether are left with no
64
opportunity to recover.
There also exists the possibility that the court's adoption of an
objective standard concerning the accrual of the statute of
limitations may serve as a disincentive for public vaccinations.
This threatens the government's public health interests, including
individual and herd immunity. While the recent near-record-high
61 See DINGELL, supra note 4, at 7 (calling the "inadequacy" of the tort system
one of the "overriding concerns" leading to the NCVIA).
62 Markovich I, supra note 29, at 17.
63 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2)(A); see also § 300aa-16 (The ability to file a
claim in civil court is contingent upon having already filed a petition in vaccine
court. The three year statute of limitations describes the period beyond which
no petition may be filed.).
64 42 U.S.C. § 300aa- I1(a)(2)(A); see also § 300aa-16.
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rates of childhood vaccination in this country result in part from
the faith that citizens have in vaccine safety,6' a small but vocal
community of parents, health care practitioners, and researchers,
who argue vehemently against vaccination, has emerged. They
allege, among other things, that many vaccines contribute to
autism.66 Any loss of faith in the vaccine system (including in the
VICP) has the potential to drive parents to consider the arguments
of the anti-vaccination community and refuse to consent to
vaccination of their children.
B. Inaccurate Statutory Interpretation
The section of the NCVIA that limits actions under the VICP
provides that "no petition may be filed for compensation under the
Program for [a vaccine-related injury] after the expiration of 36
months after the date of the occurrence of the first symptom or
manifestation of onset . . . ."6' The court held that the NCVIA
requires the statute of limitations to have accrued when Ashlyn
Markovich's eye-blinking episodes began.8 In presenting its
holding as mandated by statute, the court discussed the sovereign
immunity doctrine 69 and its effect on an interpretation of the
NCVIA.70 The court stated that it was required to "strictly and
narrowly construe[] [the NCVIA] because it is 'a condition on the
65 CDC-Press Release Sept. 4, 2008, http://www.cdc.gov/media/
pressrel/2008/r080904.itm. Undoubtedly, compulsory vaccination laws deserve
some of the credit. See, e.g 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 41A.0401-.0406 (2008)
(requiring that children in North Carolina receive various vaccines, including
DTP).
6 See generally Vaccine information, http://www.vaccinetruth.org (last
visited Oct. 22, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology). The Vaccine information homepage contains links to over forty
hosted pages, as well as external links, about the perceived dangers of
vaccination. Id.
6742 U.S.C. § 300aa-16(a)(2).
68 Markovich III, supra note 7, at 1360.
69 See United States v. Nordic Village Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992) ("[T]he
traditional principle [of sovereign immunity doctrine is] that the Government's
consent to be sued 'must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign, and not
enlarged beyond what the statute requires' .....
70 Markovich Ill, supra note 7, at 1360.
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waiver of sovereign immunity by the United States, and courts
should be careful not to interpret [a waiver] in a manner that would
extend the waiver beyond that which Congress intended.' 1
However, the VICP represents a waiver of sovereign immunity
only in a limited form. The money paid to petitioners under the
VICP does not come from the public treasury of the United States,
but from an ad hoc trust fund.72 This is unlike other statutes, such
as the Federal Tort Claims Act,73 which does entail disbursements
from the treasury as a waiver of sovereign immunity.T 7 While
granting aggrieved parties an unrestricted opportunity to seek
recovery from the public treasury could pave the way for unlimited
financial liability, there is no such risk when the only money that
may be paid out comes from an isolated, limited fund75 .
Another feature distinguishing the VICP from ordinary
waivers of sovereign immunity is the fact that it serves a remedial
purpose.76 It is true that the Court of Federal Claims declined to
accept the proposition that the remedial nature of the statute
required it to "provide compensation to injured persons whenever
possible,"" but the Court saw its ruling as a way to avoid "absurd
scenarios." 8 It can hardly be said that the Markoviches' proposed
subjective trigger for the statute of limitations-which would
merely present parents with a chance to have actual knowledge of
their child's injury before the VICP clock begins to tick-invites
absurd scenarios.
71 id.
72 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(i); 26 U.S.C. § 9510.
7 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 2680.
74 Randy J. Sutton, Annotation, Construction and Application of Federal Tort
Claims Act-United States Supreme Court Cases, 24 A.L.R. FED. 2D 329, § 4
(1997).
75 26 U.S.C. § 95 10(d) (limiting the liability of the United States under claims
filed against the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund to the amount of
money in that fund).
76 See McGowan v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 31 Fed. Cl. 734,
740 (Fed. Cl. 1994) (referring to the "remedial nature of [the NCVIA]").
77 id.
78 Id. at 739.
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Even disregarding the larger policy contradictions that the
objective standard entails, it naturally results in a conflict between
the meaning of the words in the statute and the court's
interpretation of them. The court focuses on particular language in
the portion of the NCVIA that addresses the statute of limitations:
"no petition may be filed ... after the expiration of 36 months after
the date of the occurrence of the first symptom or manifestation of
onset . . . ."9 The court read the disjunctive word "or" separating
"symptom" and "manifestation of onset" to indicate Congressional
intent to begin the accrual of the statute of limitations at the earlier
of the two." Therefore, the Markovich court concluded, Ashlyn
Markovich's eye-blinking episodes-the first "symptom" of her
seizure disorder-triggered the statute of limitations."
However, this interpretation is based upon an incorrect
understanding of the word "symptom."82 A symptom is a "morbid
phenomenon or departure from the normal in structure, function, or
sensation, experienced by the patient and indicative of disease."
This is as distinguished from a "sign" ("an objective indication of
disease, in contrast to a symptom, which is a subjective indication
of disease")84 or a "manifestation" ("[tihe display or disclosure of
79 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16(a)(2) (emphasis added).
so Markovich III, supra note 7, at 1357 (emphasis added); see also 1A
NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 184-188 § 21:14
(6th ed. 2002) ("['And' and 'or'] are not interchangeable, and their strict
meaning should be followed when their accurate reading does not render the
sense of the statute confusing and there is no clear legislative intent to have the
words not mean what they strictly should.")
si Markovich Ill, supra note 7, at 1360.
82 While "symptom" has an unambiguous, precise meaning, see infra note 83,
the nuance of the word may be lost on people untrained in the science of
medical diagnosis.
STEDMAN'S, supra note 2, at 1742; see also ATTORNEY'S ILLUSTRATED
MEDICAL DICTIONARY S90 (1997) [hereinafter DICTIONARY].
84 STEDMAN'S, supra note 2, at 1635 (emphasis added); see also DICTIONARY,
supra note 83, at S27; qf 20 C.F.R. § 416.928 (2008). This subpart of the Social
Security Administration's regulations describes the difference between
symptoms and signs: "[s]ymptoms are [one's] own description of ... physical
or mental impairment. [in the case of a child under age 18, the Administration]
will accept as a statement of this symptom(s) the description [of] . . . a
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characteristic signs or symptoms of an illness.")." The
Markoviches stated that they believed their daughter's rapid eye-
blinking to be simply an indication that she was tired and certainly
nothing about which to be concerned." Without having the ability
to gauge the subjective experience of Ashlyn, her eye-blinking
episode is better labeled a sign, not a symptom. Under the
NCVIA, the presence of bare signs not constituting a manifestation
is not a listed as a trigger for the accrual of the statute of
limitations. 87
A symptom is a subjective indicator." In any objective
standard based on a subjective indicator, subjectivity remains a
necessary component. The inherently subjective nature of
symptoms, coupled with the inability of a person of Ashlyn's age
to communicate her subjective experiences in a meaningful way,
suggests that the "symptom" prong of the statute of limitations is
poorly suited to address injuries to infants.89 An older child or an
adult is able to communicate the subjective experience that is
associated with an objectively observable sign, thereby
communicating a symptom. Conversely, an infant is only able to
parent .... Signs are anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities
which can be observed, apart from [symptoms]." Id.
" STEDMAN'S, supra note 2, at 1062; see also DICTIONARY, supra note 83, at
M10.
86 Markovich III, supra note 7, at 1354.
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 6(a)(2). The Act does not explicitly state that signs
not arising to the level of manifestations do not trigger the statute of limitations,
but that much is apparent by negative implication-symptoms and
manifestations are listed as triggering events, while signs are not. It cannot be
presumed that the Act treats signs and symptoms identically, as elsewhere it
makes mention of "signs and symptoms ... ." See id. § 300aa-14(b)(3)(A). The
conjunctive "and" indicates an understanding that "sign" and "symptom" are not
identical, and, thus, they ought not to be treated as such.
8 STEDMAN'S, supra note 2, at 1635; see also DICTIONARY, supra note 83, at
S27; qf 20 C.F.R. § 416.928.
89 See Definition, Diagnosis, Disease Types, and Classification of Asthma,
136(suppl. 1) INT. ARCH. ALLERGY IMMUNOL. 3, 3 (2005) (advising that
although symptoms are usually used to diagnose a condition [dyspnea, in this
case], because symptoms are subjective and infants are unable to communicate
subjective experiences, signs should be used to diagnose the condition).
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display signs, manifestations, or some combination of signs within
manifestations. 90 Ashlyn's grand-mal seizure on August 30, 2000,
was such a manifestation, and the court should have interpreted
this event, rather than the eye-blinking episode, as the trigger for
the statute of limitations.1
IV. CONCLUSION
In adopting an objective indicator as the standard for accrual of
the VICP statute of limitations, the Markovich court established a
precedent that tends to undermine congressional intent to create a
petitioner-friendly alternative to civil tort litigation and ensure that
children are vaccinated. Furthermore, the objective standard is
unwieldy in light of the possible subjective nature of a triggering
event, which the court failed to appreciate. The Markovich
decision will only hurt, not help, the important interests served by
immunization policy and the NCVIA.
90 STEDMAN'S, supra note 2, at 1062; see also DICTIONARY, supra note 83, at
M10.
91 Markovich Ill, supra note 7, at 1357.
